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
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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA**

**"RENO" V**

**WORKING DRAFT  
OF  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
OPERATIONS OF THE  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
1944-1945**

8 MAY 1944

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MEMO V  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
OPERATIONS OF THE  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF  
THE PHILIPPINES

5 MAY 1944

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MEMO V  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
OPERATIONS OF THE  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA  
TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF  
THE PHILIPPINES

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MEMO V

COILED PLAN

FOR

OPERATIONS OF THE

SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

TO INCLUDE THE REOCCUPATION OF

THE PHILIPPINES

1. CONCEPT.

a. OPERATIONS IN THE PACIFIC, 1944.

- (1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have designated the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area as the strategic objective of operations in the PACIFIC during 1944 and early 1945 in order to support the Chinese war effort and establish bases for a final assault upon JAPAN. They have decided to establish forces in the FORMOSA-LUZON-CHINA area by advances from present positions through the MARIANAS, CAROLINES, PALAU and MINDANAO as follows:

- (a) Establishment of control of the MARIANAS-CAROLINES-PALAU area by forces of the Pacific Ocean Areas:

1. By neutralization of TRUK, and occupation of the Southern MARIANAS during June 1944.

Objective, to secure control of sea communications in the Central PACIFIC by isolating and neutralizing the CAROLINES, and by establishing sea and air bases for operations against Japanese sea routes and for long-range air attack against the Japanese Homeland.

2. By occupation of PALAU during September 1944.

Objectives, to extend our control to the eastern approaches to the PHILIPPINES and FORMOSA, and to establish a fleet and air base and forward staging area for the support of operations against MINDANAO, FORMOSA and CHINA.

- (b) Occupation of MINDANAO by forces of the Southwest Pacific Area, supported by the PACIFIC Fleet, target date 15 November 1944.

Objective, to establish air forces to reduce and contain Japanese forces in the PHILIPPINES preparatory to a further advance to FORMOSA, either directly or via LUZON, and to conduct air strikes against enemy installations in the W.E.I.

- (c) Occupation of FORMOSA, or occupation of LUZON should such operations prove necessary prior to the move on FORMOSA, target date 15 February 1945.

The Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, is assigned responsibility for planning LUZON operations.

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- (2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also indicated that certain very long-range elements of the 20th Air Force may be employed from Northwestern AUSTRALIA against targets in the N.E.I. in the event that necessary bases are unavailable in the Southern MARIANAS.

b. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES, SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA.

Under the above concept of PACIFIC operations, the strategic objectives of the Southwest Pacific Area are:

- (1) To establish necessary land, naval and air bases in the Southern PHILIPPINES.
- (2) To re-establish U.S. sovereignty in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
- (3) To support operations into the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area by destroying or containing hostile forces in the PHILIPPINES, and providing such air, naval and logistic support as may prove necessary.
- (4) To reduce the hostile war-making power by air operations against installations in the N.E.I.

c. TASKS.

Present

The tasks assigned the Southwest Pacific Area by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are:

"Complete the isolation of RABAU and KAVIENG with minimum commitment of forces."

"Assist in the neutralization of TRUK and PALAU."

"Following HOLLANDIA, with available forces, conduct operations along the NEW GUINEA coast and such other operations as may be feasible in preparation for support of the PALAU operation and the assault on MINDANAO."

Eventual

Eventual tasks to complete attainment of strategic objectives will presumably be:

Seize MINDANAO by waterborne and airborne operations, and establish land, naval and air bases for support of subsequent operations to seize the LUZON-FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Re-occupy LUZON, establish bases as necessary and provide air and naval support for operations into the FORMOSA and CHINA coast areas.

Destroy hostile installations, sources of war materials and shipping in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

d. ANALYSIS OF TASKS.

This outline plan embodies operations along the NEW GUINEA axis preliminary to the occupation of PALAU and MINDANAO, the seizure of MINDANAO, and the reoccupation of the Northern PHILIPPINES, under the assumption that the latter operation proves a necessary preliminary to penetration of the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area. Support by the full resources of the PACIFIC Fleet throughout PHILIPPINE operations is assumed.

Initially, an advance is required northwestward from HOLLANDIA with forces made available by J.C.S. 713/5 to seize air bases necessary for

fully effective support of PALAU operations and general support of MINDANAO operations. Thereafter, seizure of additional bases is necessary to provide land-based direct air support and flank protection for the attack upon MINDANAO.

While hostile garrisons along our line of advance are at present comparatively weak, and MINDANAO is partly controlled by our own guerrillas who operate extensive intelligence and communications nets, the enemy is actively consolidating his positions throughout the area. Garrisons are being reinforced by major elements of the Japanese army as rapidly as shipping permits, air bases are being augmented and stocked and advance naval facilities increased. While our ability to isolate a given objective and bring overwhelming forces to bear upon it will continue, we may anticipate that as his consolidation progresses, seizure will require more elaborate and sustained support as well as greater assault forces. Our operations into MINDANAO become a race against hostile defensive development, with the earliest practicable establishment of control over PALAU and HAINAN a factor of major importance.

Destruction of hostile air and light naval forces in LUZON and establishment of bases for support of FORMOSA-CHINA coast operations will require occupation of the Central Plains area of the Island, including MANILA. Subsequent establishment of air elements at the extreme north in the vicinity of APARRI will probably also prove necessary. The occupation of LUZON will bring about complete destruction of Japanese forces throughout the Islands and redeem our National pledge to the PHILIPPINE people.

Air action all along the line of contact is required to destroy hostile war materials at the source and in transit in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

Throughout these operations, the isolation of RABUL and KAVIENG must be maintained with minimum forces.

#### c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER.

##### (1) General.

The general scheme of maneuver is to advance our land-based bomber line westward along the land masses of Western NEW GUINEA and intervening islands to the PHILIPPINES by successive occupation of the minimum bases required. Steps are coordinated with operations in the MANDATES to provide, in each instance, necessary land-based air support for subsequent operations. Hostile strength is by-passed wherever practicable and our flanks protected essentially by air action,

In the PHILIPPINES, air forces and advance naval bases are established in order to extend the range of air and naval action and provide the support required for successful penetration by United Nations forces into the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Destructive air attacks are employed to soften up and gain air superiority over hostile air bases endangering our next advance. Hostile naval forces and shipping are destroyed along the line of advance, preventing reinforcement or supply of enemy air and naval forces within range and of objectives under attack. Ground forces are displaced forward by water and air, covered by naval and/or air forces, to seize and establish bases in each successive objective. Air and naval forces are established and the process repeated to successive objectives. Intermediate hostile installations by-passed are neutralized or contained by air, land and sea action. Air attacks are delivered by the most effective combination of land-based

and ~~other~~ ~~available~~ ~~at the time~~. When ~~capabilities are~~ available in sufficient force to provide unassisted direct air support of landing operations, the number of objectives is decreased and the length of the ~~period~~ ~~correspondingly~~ extended.

(2) The operations divide as follows (see Annex 1).

Phase I

An advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the GREENWICH BAY area the bases required initially for support of operations to seize PALAU and subsequently for support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO.

Phase II

Continuation of the advance northwestward to seize in the HAINAN area the bases required for land-based direct air support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO. Air bases in the ARAFURA SEA area are occupied if required to implement these operations.

Phase III

Occupation of MINDANAO and establishment of bases for the reoccupation of LUZON and for air operations in the Northern BORNEO area.

Phase IV

(As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Reoccupation of LUZON and establishment of bases necessary for support of attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

Continuing Commitments

Maintenance of the neutralization of RARAU and KAVIENG with minimum forces, until occupation becomes more economical.

Air operations against hostile installations, sources of war materials and shipping in the BORNEO-N.E.I. area.

(3) Sequence and Timing.

The above sequence is based largely upon dispositions and capabilities and is subject to change dependent upon hostile reaction and the measure of success attained in operations in the MANDATES and along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis.

Timing is dependent upon availability of means and progress of hostile consolidation.

Flexibility is attained, to take advantage of enemy weakness, by elimination of objectives or phases.

The timing of operations given below is based upon decisions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and availability of means as outlined in J.C.S. 713/5 and WD radiogram 9171/12 March:

Phase I	-	May - July 1944
Phase II	-	August - October 1944
Phase III	-	November - December 1944
Phase IV	-	January - June 1945

(4) Major Combat Elements Required.

Minimum estimates of requirements in major units, air groups and amphibious lift are shown in Annex 3.



# **f. LOGISTIC ARRANGEMENTS.**

Logistic support for offensive operations is provided from intermediate and advance bases along the NEW GUINEA-MINDANAO axis, that for neutralization operations in the BOUGAINVILLE-NEW IRELAND area from bases along the SOLOMONS axis. Major amphibious operations are launched from mounting areas maintained on the north coast of NEW GUINEA and in the South Pacific Area.

Task forces establish supply points for support of local garrisons in newly-occupied areas. Initially, supplies are obtained from bases now established or under construction, while as operations progress, ports and supply bases are advanced by corresponding bounds.

Heavy ships are employed for concentration of troops and for movement to forward areas where port or lighterage facilities are adequate. Amphibious craft are used for the forward movement from concentration areas of assault elements with accompanying or immediately following equipment and supplies. Upon completion of the assault phase, heavy ships are utilized to advance the supporting elements, service troops, materials and supplies necessary to complete the consolidation and to establish ports and bases. Bulk petroleum products are transported forward to intermediate bases in small tankers to locations where the tactical situation permits installation of bulk storage.

Assault units are in general rehabilitated in place, and every effort is made to eliminate rearward movement of troops and equipment.

As intermediate and advance bases are developed in forward areas, trans-PACIFIC shipping is diverted directly thereto in increasing volume.

For proposed logistic establishments, see Annex 5.

**2. OPERATIONS.****PHASE I****a. TASK.**

Advance northwestward along the north coast of NEW GUINEA to seize and establish in the **SEELVINK BAY** area the bases required initially for support of operations to seize **PALAU** and subsequently for support and flank protection of operations to occupy **MINDANAO**.

**b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.**

Air bases are required in **SEELVINK BAY** to defeat hostile attempts to establish an effective defense in Western **NEW GUINEA** and the **MOLUKKAS**, and to neutralize hostile air and naval forces in the **HALMAHERA** area during **PALAU** operations. These same bases are required during the **MINDANAO** operation for staging purposes, and by air forces charged with protection of the western flank. Suitable sites are under active development by the enemy on **BIAK ISLAND** and in the **NOEMFOOR-MAPOEWARI-NOEMI** triangle. Our entry into **SEELVINK BAY** will require establishment of an intermediate fighter base for direct air support and convey cover.

Operations to occupy the necessary bases must be conducted by forces allocated to the Southwest Pacific Area by J.C.S. 713/5.

**c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2a).****(1) WAKDE, May 1944.**

A preliminary landing operation from **HOLLANDIA** establishes an advance fighter base in the **WAKDE** area to provide close air support and cover for subsequent operations to seize **BIAK ISLAND**. Direct air support and convey cover for the **WAKDE** operation are provided from **HOLLANDIA** airdromes.

**(2) BIAK ISLAND, June 1944.**

As soon as adequate direct air support and convey cover become available, an overseas landing operation from **HOLLANDIA** seizes hostile airdromes on **BIAK ISLAND**. Direct and general air support are provided from Northern **NEW GUINEA** airdromes, general support from the **DARWIN** area. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

The necessary air and light naval bases are established to maintain neutralization of hostile forces in the **VOGELKOP** and **MACCLUER GULF** areas and provide for long-range operations into **HALMAHERA** by attack bombardment. Advance staging areas and naval facilities are developed for support of subsequent operations into the Northern **VOGELKOP** and **HALMAHERA**.

**(3) BISMARCKS-BOUGAINVILLE.**

In order to reduce air and naval elements committed to containing operations, mopping up on **BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND** is continued to a point where hostile forces are beyond capability of conducting or facilitating air and/or naval interference with our operations. Air and naval blockade of the **RABAU-NEW IRELAND** area are continued.

d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Present<sup>I</sup></u>	<u>CMR Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
1-2/3 Divs	3 Divs (1 immediately available) 1 Regt Preht	9-2/3 Divs	14-1/3 Divs 1 Regt Preht

<sup>I</sup>Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.<sup>XX</sup>

Assigned elements 5th Air Force  
 " " 13th Air Force  
 " " RAAF Command  
 " " 7th Fleet  
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements assigned for operations against the KARBUL-KAVIENG area.

<sup>XX</sup>Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
7th Fleet	NAKDE, 2/3 Div BIAR, 1-1/3 Divs

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5b.

PLAN B

a. TASK.

Seize in the HALMAHERA area bases required for land-based direct air support and flank protection of operations to occupy MINDANAO. Air bases in the ANATOLIA SEA area are occupied if required to implement these operations.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Advance into MINDANAO from the Line PALAU-GEELVINK BAY requires neutralization of the threat to our operations from hostile bases in HALMAHERA and MENDO as well as establishment of intermediate staging fields to permit employment of airborne forces. Possession of such fields also permits augmentation of carrier-based direct air support by land-based fighters and the employment of land-based attack bombardment against hostile naval forces in the MOROTAI PASSAGE and Eastern GREENS SEA. Although occupied by the enemy, fields on Northern HALMAHERA and/or MOROTAI offer the most satisfactory fulfillment of these requirements. Other sites are handicapped by limited capacity and/or less suitable geographical locations.

Seizure of Northern HALMAHERA direct from bases at HOLLANDIA and GEELVINK BAY requires an intermediate step to deploy the necessary land-based direct air support at suitable points in the Northern VOGELKOP or WAIGEO ISLAND. If occupied, the SELE STRAIT area brings with it oil fields with a potential yield of 10,000 barrels daily.

In event material hostile land-based air opposition develops in the Eastern M.E.I., it may prove necessary to establish air forces in the KAI and YAMINBAR Groups to neutralize the AMBOI area and support our advance westward of the VOGELKOP.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2b).

(1) Northern VOGELKOP, August 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases are established on the northern coast of the VOGELKOP or on WAIGEO ISLAND, as reconnaissance and the hostile situation at the time indicates, by an overseas landing operation from HOLLANDIA with advance elements staged at BEAK ISLAND. Direct air support is provided from GEELVINK BAY, general support from Northern NEW GUINEA and BAWEN airdromes.

Air and naval elements are established for flank protection and direct support of operations to seize objectives in the MOROTAI-Northern HALMAHERA area.

(2) HALMAHERA, September 1944.

Airdromes and light naval bases in HALMAHERA and MOROTAI are seized or neutralized by an overseas landing operation from NEW GUINEA bases. The operation is coordinated with seizure of PALAU by Pacific Ocean Area Forces. Direct air support is provided by carrier-based elements or from the VOGELKOP, general support from Northwestern AUSTRALIA and Northern NEW GUINEA. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

Air and naval elements are established in the MOROTAI-Northern HALMAHERA area for flank protection, support and staging of airborne elements in subsequent operations to occupy MINDANAO.

(3) **ANAFURA SEA, August 1944.**

In event hostile strength in the Eastern M.I.L. requires advance of our border line into the BIMA SEA area to implement operations northward of the VOGLKOP, amphibious forces are moved from Northern M.I. BIMA, and the KAI and TAIKUMA Groups are relieved by amphibious operations employing Australian forces. Direct air support and convey cover are provided by land-based elements from BIMA and ANAFURA LAND airbases. Naval support is provided by the 7th Fleet.

Air elements are promptly established for support of operations into the BIMA SEA area.

Diversification of amphibious lift to this operation will either require provision of lift for Northern VOGLKOP and BIMA SEA from extra-theater sources or involve a corresponding delay in these operations.

d. **ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).**

(1) **Land Forces.**

<u>Assault<sup>x</sup></u>	<u>ORG Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
VOGLKOP-BAIMANERA, 3 Divs ANAFURA SEA, 2 Divs	6 Divs (3 Divs + 3 Divs)	8-2/3 Divs	19-2/3 Divs

<sup>x</sup>Including assault force reserves.

(2) **Air Forces.<sup>xx</sup>**

Assigned elements 5th Air Force  
" " 13th Air Force  
" " RAAF Command  
" " 7th Fleet

U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements assigned for operations in the BIMA-BAIMANERA area.

<sup>xx</sup>Shore-based, including rear-area protective elements.

(3) **Naval Forces.**

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. PACIFIC Fleet, incident to PALAU operations,	7th Fleet,	Western VOGLKOP, 1 Div BAIMANERA, 1-1/2 Divs ANAFURA SEA, 1 Div

e. **LOGISTIC SUPPORT.**

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5e.

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PLANS 101

a. TASK.

Occupy MINDANAO and establish bases for the reoccupation of Luzon and for air operations in the Northern BORNEO area.

b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.

Occupation of MINDANAO requires combined airborne and overseas landing operations on a major scale to seize the necessary beachheads and quickly secure the portions of the island vital to our purposes. Our major objective areas are the north-central plateau VALENCIA-CAGAYAN area as a base for attack aviation operations into LUZON, the DAVAO area as a naval and logistic base and the coastal area COTABATO-MALABANG for heavy bombardment bases and overland operations to occupy the road net of the island. SURIGAO, Zamboanga, Jolo and Zamboanga are required later to control entrances to the waters to the northwest.

The existing guerrilla organizations are capable of material assistance in our operations. Prompt and ample seaborne reinforcement and supply of initial assaults are mandatory. Airborne operations to quickly seize our inland objectives and permit employment of air transport on a major scale to supplement seaborne movement, are essential to prompt isolation of principal hostile forces from each other and for speedy development of air bases for support of subsequent operations. These airborne operations become feasible upon establishment of adequate staging bases along the line from Western NEW GUINEA.

c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2c).

(1) MINDANAO, 15 November 1944.

Beachheads in the COTABATO-MALABANG and SARANGANI BAY areas of MINDANAO are seized by overseas landing operations with massed carrier-based air support, employing the combined amphibious and naval forces available at that time. These operations are accompanied by airborne movement to activate inland fields seized in conjunction with guerrilla forces. Fighters are flown in to these fields and to airdromes established on the coast, to relieve carrier-based forces and maintain air superiority over the island. Landing forces advance as rapidly as practicable to the support of airborne forces and establish control of the road net and airdromes of the area SARANGANI-CAGAYAN, ILIGAN-MALABANG-COTABATO. Thereafter, DAVAO is reduced by combined overland and short-range landing operations, supported by the Fleet. Remaining hostile centers of resistance are then reduced in detail.

Amphibious lift is employed in the initial movement of ground echelons of air units with their operating supplies.

Logistic and naval bases are promptly developed at DAVAO while air forces are established in the COTABATO-MALABANG and the VALENCIA-DEL MONTE areas. Preparations are expedited for the advance upon LUZON.

The SULU ARCHIPELAGO is occupied by minor consolidation operations and air forces are established for operations against hostile installations in Northern BORNEO.

(2) RABAU-NEW IRELAND.

When blockade has reduced resistance in RABAU and NEW IRELAND to a point where it is more economical to occupy than to maintain containing forces, these areas are taken over by Australian forces and hostile remnants mopped up.

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4. REQUIREMENTS OF MINIMUM CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS (see Annex 3).

(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault</u> <sup>X</sup>	<u>USMC Reserve</u>	<u>Guards</u>	<u>Total</u>
MINIMUM,	3 Divs Inf	6-1/3 Divs Inf	16-1/3 Divs Inf
5 Divs Inf			1 Div AF
1 Div AF			1 Div (Asst)
1 Rgt Front			1 Rgt Front
1 Rgt Cav			1 Rgt Cav
2 Rgts Inf (Philippine),			2 Rgts Inf (Philippine),
less 2 Bns			less 2 Bns
1 Div (Asst), RARAU			

<sup>X</sup> Including assault force reserves.

(2) Air Forces.<sup>XX</sup>

Assigned elements: 5th Air Force  
 " " 13th Air Force  
 " " RAAF Command  
 " " 7th Fleet  
 Supporting " 7th Air Force (from PALAU)  
 U.S. Naval and Marine land-based elements for  
 rear-area operations in the RARAU-NEW IRRELAND area.

<sup>XX</sup> Including rear-area protective elements.

(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by J.C.S., to ensure non-inter- ference by hostile fleet elements and to provide major carrier- borne direct air support of the operations.	7th Fleet (reinforced)	6 Divs, overseas landing opera- tions. 1 Div, short-range equipment.

e. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5d.

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**PHASE IV**  
(as directed)

**a. TASK.**

Reoccupy LUZON and establish bases necessary for support of attack upon the FORMOSA-CHINA coast area.

**b. ANALYSIS OF THE TASK.**

Reoccupation of LUZON requires amphibious operations along familiar lines to seize initially the Central Plain and MANILA areas. Extensive bases will be required for the support of the attack into FORMOSA and CHINA. Existing airfields and base facilities can be readily improved to permit initiation of VLR bombing of JAPAN.

**c. SCHEME OF MANEUVER (see Annex 2d).**

**(1) VISAYAS, January 1945.**

Preliminary operations can probably be initiated from MINDANAO during January 1945 to seize advance airdromes in the VISAYAS and the SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT area of Southern LUZON for support of operations into the vital areas of that island. Troops and air and naval support for these preliminary movements are provided from MINDANAO Occupation Forces, augmented by 1 division from the HAWAIIAN area. Operations into the VISAYAS are visualized as airborne, with seaborne logistic support. An amphibious operation into the SAN BERNARDINO STRAIT area is mounted from DAVAO.

**(2) LUZON, February 1945.**

The scheme of maneuver depends upon the forces available and the disposition and strength of the enemy at that time. MANILA and the LUZON Plain are initial objectives, followed by the seizure of airdrome areas in the extreme northern portion of the island.

Bases are established as required for support of the attacks into FORMOSA and the Central CHINA coast. Naval and air operations from LUZON sever Japanese shipping routes in the South CHINA SEA.

**(3) Strategic Bombing Operations.**

Strategic bombing operations, which have been conducted from Northwest AUSTRALIA throughout preceding phases, are extended to Northern BORNEO and into the South CHINA SEA, from the SULU ARCHIPELAGO and fields activated by minor operations on PALAWAN. VLR operations against JAPAN and hostile installations in KOREA and North CHINA may be initiated after relatively easy improvement of Central and Northern LUZON air base facilities.

**d. ESTIMATE OF PRINCIPAL COMBAT ELEMENTS REQUIRED (see Annex 3).**

In view of profound changes in the PACIFIC situation which are certain to occur prior to the event, it is considered impracticable at this time to make specific estimates of forces required. The following should be regarded only as a guide to planning:

TOP SECRET



(1) Land Forces.

<u>Assault<sup>x</sup></u>	<u>GHQ Reserve</u>	<u>Garrison</u>	<u>Total</u>
<b>PANAY-LEGASPI,</b>	1 Div Inf	6-1/3 Divs	18-1/3 Divs Inf
3 Divs Inf	2 Divs Inf (available		1 Div AB
1 Div AB	in May)		1 Rgt Preht
1 Rgt Preht			2 Rgts Inf
<b>LUBON,</b>			(Filipino),
6 Divs Inf			less 2 Bns
1 Div AB			
1 Rgt Preht			
2 Rgts Inf			
(Filipino),			
less 2 Bns			

<sup>x</sup> Including assault force reserves.(2) Air Forces. <sup>xx</sup>

Assigned elements	5th Air Force
" "	13th Air Force
" "	RAAF Command
" "	7th Fleet
Attached	7th Air Force (operating from MINDANAO)

<sup>xx</sup> Including rear-area protective elements.(3) Naval Forces.

<u>Strategic Support</u>	<u>Direct Support</u>	<u>Amphibious Lift</u>
U.S. Fleet, as directed by J.C.S., to ensure non-interference by hostile fleet elements and provide major carrier-based air support.	7th Fleet (reinforced)	8-1/4 Divs plus PANAY follow-up.

c. LOGISTIC SUPPORT.

For location of bases for logistic support, see Annex 5c.










GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No. 1



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

ANNEX 2-4  
REMO V  
PHASE 1  
MAY - JULY  
1944

LEGEND  
OBJECTIVE AREA  
AND  
ASSAULT ELEMENT

AMERICAN OPERATION  
TARGET DATE  
AND  
MOUNTING AREA

REMANUFACTURING  
AND TRAINING

CARRISON


41  
JUNE 128 32  
158 CT  
WAKU  
HOLLANDIA  
ATTACK  
41 +  
CHQ RES  
24  
32 (-1 CT)  
93  
NEW GUINEA  
5 AUST  
11 AUST  
4 AUST  
30  
112  
114  
43  
503  
CHQ RES  
25 CHQ RES (NEW CALEDONIA)





GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No. \_\_\_\_\_



ANNEX 2-b  
RMO V  
PHASE II  
AUGUST-OCTOBER  
1944

- LEMNO
- OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSAULT ELEMENT
- CONTINGENT OBJECTIVE AREA
- AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION TARGET DATE AND MOUNTING AREA
- REHABILITATION AND TRAINING
- GARRISON

OPERATION CONDUCTED IN EVENT  
HOSTILE STRONG IN EASTERN  
NEW GUINEA REQUIRES SUPPORT FOR  
OPERATIONS WEST OF NEW GUINEA

(31, 6, 33 IN  
SUCCESSION)

WITHDRAWN IF  
KAT-TANTUBAR OCCUPIED

25 AUG 2 AUG 2 AUG 7 AUG 1 DIV  
(-1 BRIG) (ATHERTON)

1 DIV  
CAIRNS



SCALE ~~ANNEX 1~~ 2-6 CUTAL-NES


## MEMO V

### PHASE III

NOV - DEC  
1944



### OBJECTIVE AREA AND ASSAULT ELEMENT




AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION  
TARGET DATE AND  
MOUNTING AREA



## REHABILITATION AND TRAINING

GARRISON




## AIRBORNE OPERATION





GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No. \_\_\_\_\_




SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES  
ANNEX 2-4  
RENO V  
PHASE IV  
JAN-JUNE 1945



OBJECTIVE AREA  
AND  
ASSAULT ELEMENT



CONTINGENT OBJECTIVE  
JAN




AMBUSHING OPERATION  
TARGET DATE  
AND  
MOUNTING AREA



REHABILITATION  
AND TRAINING



GARRISON



AIRBORNE OPERATION

TOP SECRET



ESTIMATE OF  
PRINCIPAL  
COMBAT  
ELEMENTS  
REQUIRED

## MAJOR UNITS

## AMPHIBIOUS LIFT\*

## AIR FORCES

	Assault*	GHQ Res	Garrison	Total
PHASE I - May-July	1-2/3 Divs	3 Divs 1 Rgt (Prcht)	9-2/3 Divs	14-1/3 Divs 1 Rgt (Prcht)
NAKOE-BIAK -	1-2/3 Divs U.S.	2 Divs U.S. 1 Div Aust 1 Rgt (Prcht) U.S.	4 Divs U.S. 4-2/3 Divs Aust	
PHASE II - August- October	5 Divs	6 Divs 1 Rgt (Prcht)	8-2/3 Divs (Equivalent)	13-2/3 Divs 1 Rgt (Prcht)
Northern VOGELKOP- HALMAHERA -	3 Divs U.S.	5 Divs U.S. 1 Div Aust 1 Rgt (Prcht) U.S.	4-2/3 Divs U.S. 4 Divs Aust	
ARAFURA SEA** -	2 Divs Aust			
PHASE III - November- December	7 Divs 2-1/3 Rgts 1 Rgt (Prcht)	3 Divs	8-1/3 Divs	17-1/3 Divs 2-1/3 Rgts 1 Rgt (Prcht)
MINDANAO -	5 Divs (Inf) U.S. 1 Div (AB) U.S. 1-1/3 Rgts (Inf) Fil 1 Rgt (Cav) U.S. 1 Rgt (Prcht) U.S.	3 Divs U.S.	2-1/3 Divs U.S. 6 Divs Aust	
RABAU -	1 Div Aust			
PHASE IV - January- June 1945	10 Divs 1-1/3 Rgts (Inf) Fil 1 Rgt (Prcht)	3 Divs	6 Divs 1 Rgt (Cav)	19 Divs 2-1/3 Rgts 1 Rgt (Prcht)
PANAY- LAGASPI -	3 Divs (Inf) U.S. 1 Div (AB) U.S. 1 Rgt (Prcht) U.S.	1 Div (Inf) U.S. 2 Divs (Inf) U.S. (Available May)	2 Divs U.S. 4 Divs Aust 1 Rgt (Cav) U.S.	
LUZON -	6 Divs (Inf) U.S. 1 Div (AB) U.S. 1 Rgt (Prcht) U.S. 1-1/3 Rgts (Inf) Fil			

\*Includes Task Force Reserves.

\*\*Contingent.

Transport

Lift, equivalent of 2/3 Div, 1-1/3 Divs, successively, to float maximum of 28,000 personnel, 25,000 long tons.

3 APA 32 LST  
1 AKA 40 LCI  
5 APD 20 LCT

Escort

37 DD/DE/PF  
Minor escort and control craft.

Lift, equivalent of 1 Div, 1-1/2 Divs, successively, to float maximum of 33,000 personnel, 33,000 long tons.\*\*

4 APA 5 APD  
1 AKA 32 LST  
4 AK 60 LCI  
4 EC2 25 LCT

Lift, 6 Divs for MINDANAO, 1 Div for RABAU, concurrently, to float maximum of 159,000 personnel, 212,000 long tons.

65 APA 7 LSD  
26 AKA 199 LST  
15 AP 165 LCI  
18 AK 128 LCT  
18 APD

28 CVE  
135 DD/DE/PF  
Minor escort and control craft.\*\*\*

Lift, 8-1/2 Divs, including minor consolidation operations, to float maximum of 201,000 personnel, 256,000 long tons.

80 APA 7 LSD  
30 AKA 213 LST  
15 AP 210 LCI  
18 AK 102 LCT  
18 APD

26 CVE  
234 DD/DE/PF/SC/  
PC/YMS

## \*Notes:

- Initial allocation of operational vessels, training and normal maintenance not included.
- Gunfire support groups undetermined pending designation of landing areas and information concerning hostile defenses.

\*\*ARAFURA SEA Operation will require augmentation of available lift by 1 Div or involve a corresponding delay in subsequent operations.

\*\*\*Escort, RABAU Operation, 20 SC/YMS/PC, assisted by PT and VP.

	5th AF	13th AF	7th Fleet	RAAF & NEI	Total
HB	4	2-1/4			6-1/4
MB	2	1		1-3/4	4-3/4
L & DB	3			1	4
F (D)	6	2		4	12
F (N)	2/3	1/3			1
TC	4-1/2	3/4			5-1/4
Photo-Recco	2	1	1	3/4	4-3/4

38 Groups

## Assumptions:

- Naval and Marine shore-based air elements are assumed to be available for air garrison to provide search and anti-submarine patrol in the BISMARCKS-Northern SOLOMONS area.
- Carrier-based air forces of the PACIFIC Fleet are available for general and direct support of PHILIPPINE operations. They are also required for support of HALMAHERA operation if Northern VOGELKOP is by-passed.



MAJOR UNITS  
COMBAT DIVISIONS  
and  
SEPERATE REGIMENTS

RENO V

# EMPLOYMENT OF COMBAT ELEMENTS

## MAJOR UNITS

### LEGEND

Division

1st  
CAV

Rehabilitation  
and  
Training

GHQ  
Reserve

Active Garrison  
and  
Minor Operations

Assembly Area  
and  
Approach

[illegible]

## Amphibious Assault

Airborne Operation.

Intra - Theater  
Movement

### Extra - Theater Movement

(US)

EMPLOYMENT MAY PERTAIN TO ANY DIVISION COMMITTED IN MINDANAO

\* ARAFURA SEA OPERATION



UNIT	CURRENT DISPOSITION	PHASE I					PHASE II			DISPOSITION JUNE, 1945
		GEELVINK	NORTHERN VOGELKOP	(CONTINGENT) ARAFURA	HALMAHERA		MINDANAO	VISAYAS	LUZON	
43rd Inf Div	New Zealand	Vitiaz Area					X	Mindanao(3)		Luzon
37th " "	Bougainville	Vitiaz Area					X	Mindanao(3)		Mindanao(3)
25th " "	New Caledonia		Vitiaz Area				X	X(3)		Visayas(3)
3rd N.Z. "	Treasury-Green Is	Withdrawn, N.Z.								
93rd Inf "	Guadalcanal to Bougainville	Bougainville					Hollandia		X	Luzon
40th " "	Guadalcanal to New Britain	New Britain					Finschhafen		X	Luzon
Americal "	Bougainville								X	Luzon
1st Mar Div	New Britain to Guadalcanal	Withdrawn, POA								
1st Cav "	Manus						X	Mindanao(3)		Mindanao(3)
24th Inf "	X	Hollandia							X	Luzon
41st " "	X	X	Wakie-Biak						X	Luzon
31st " "	Oro		X		Vogelkop					Vogelkop
6th " "	Milne	Hollandia			X		Halmahera			Halmahera
32nd " "	Saidor-Aitape	Aitape-Biak	Aitape				X	X(3)		Visayas(3)
33rd " "	Finschhafen				X		Halmahera	X	Legaspi	Luzon
38th " "	Enroute from U.S.	Finschhafen							X	Luzon
11th AB "	U.S.	Nadzab					X	X	X	Luzon
158th Inf CT	Arawe & Kiriwina	X	Biak							Geelvink
112th Cav Rgt	Arawe	Finschhafen					X	Sulu		Sulu
503rd Frecht*	Nadzab						X	X	X	Luzon
1st Phil "	U.S.	Finschhafen	New Britain				X		X	Luzon
2nd " "	U.S.	Finschhafen	New Britain				X		X	Luzon
6th Aust Div	Atherton			X	Kai-Tanimbar				Australia	Australia
7th " "	"						X		Bismarcks	Bismarcks
9th " "	"			X	Kai-Tanimbar					Kai-Tanimbar
3rd " "	"									Australia
5th " "	Saidor & Madang	Madang	Hansa				Wewak		Hollandia	Hollandia
11th " "	Madang		Hansa				Bismarcks			Bismarcks
12th " "	Darwin									Darwin
4th " "	Merauke		Withdrawn							
2nd " "	Perth								Withdrawn	

NOTES:

- (1) All contingent operations are assumed to be carried out.
- (2) "X" indicates employment in assault phase of operation.
- (3) Assumed designation --- may be any division committed in MINDANAO.

RECAPITULATION, June 1945

U. S. Divs:

Luzon.....9  
Visayas.....2  
Mindanao.....2  
Halmahera.....1  
Vogelkop.....1

15

U.S. & Phil. Rgts:

Luzon.....3  
Mindanao.....1  
Geelvink.....1

5

Aust Divs:

Australia.....4  
Bismarcks.....2  
New Guinea.....1  
Arafura.....1

8

TOP SECRET














GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No. \_\_\_\_\_



ANNEX 4-c-3

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE IIB

HALMAHERA

2 Heavy Bomb Groups  
1 LAB Squadron  
3 Medium Bomb Groups  
2 Fighter Groups  
1 Photo Group  
1 Recco Group  
1 PB4Y Squadron  
Facilities for 10 T.C.  
Groups plus Glider  
echelon.  
1 Night Fighter Squadron

AYU

2 Fighter Groups  
1 Light Bomb Group plus  
staging for 2 Heavy  
Groups or the equivalent  
if available.

MAPIA

Radio Range facilities  
and emergency crash  
landing strip.

BIAK

3 Heavy Bomb Groups  
2 Light Bomb Groups  
5 Fighter Groups  
1 Photo Group  
3 T.C. Groups  
1 PB4Y Squadron  
1 Night Fighter Sq  
2 PB2Y Squadrons

MANUS

2 Fighter Squadrons  
2 PB2Y Squadrons

TANIMBAR

2 Fighter Groups  
1 Medium Bomb Group  
1 Heavy Bomb Group  
2 PB2Y Squadrons

WAKDE

1 Fighter Group


NEW GUINEA  
HOLLANDIA

1 Fighter Sq  
2 T.C. Groups

DARWIN

1 Fighter Sqdn







GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

To Accompany G-3  
Operations Report No. \_\_\_\_\_



SCALE IN NAUTICAL MILES

RENO V

DEPLOYMENT OF AIR GROUPS

PHASE IVa

PANAY

13th A/F,  
reinforced by 5th A/F.

- 2 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 1 LAB Squadron
- 1 Medium Bomb Group
- 5 Fighter Groups
- 1 Photo Recon Group
- 1 Recon Group
- 4 Light Bomb Groups
- 10 T.C. Groups

MINDANAO

5th A/F

- 3 Heavy Bomb Groups
- 3 Medium Bomb Groups
- 5 Fighter Groups
- 1 Photo Group
- 1 Recon Group
- 2 Night Fighter Squadrons
- 2 PB1Y Squadrons
- 1 PV Squadron
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons
- 3 T.C. Groups

HALMAHERA

- 1 Heavy Bomb Group
- 1 Medium Bomb Group
- 1 Fighter Group
- 2 PB2Y Squadrons
- 1 T.C. Group

MANUS

Naval Fighter Squadrons  
2 PB2Y Squadrons

Line of Communications  
HALMAHERA to HOLLANDIA  
as required.  
1 T.C. Group

TANIMBAR

1 Fighter Group  
2 PB2Y Squadrons

DARWIN


1 Fighter Squadron

1725









ANNEX 5-a

## RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT  
INITIAL MAIN  
SUPPLY BASES

### LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⊙ Naval Lion.
- ⊙ Naval Cub.
- ⊙ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊙ Air Depot.
- ⊙ Supply Base, Australian Army Only.

~~TOP SECRET~~









ANNEX 5-c

# RENO V

LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE II

## LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⊕ Naval Lion.
- ⊕ Naval Cub.
- ⊕ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊕ Air Depot.
- Proposed.

TOP SECRET



ANNEX 5-d

# RENO V


LOCATION OF BASES  
FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT

PHASE III

## LEGEND

- ⊙ Army Main Supply Base.
- Army Intermediate Supply Base.
- Army Advance Supply Base.
- + Army Task Force Supply Point.
- ⊙ Naval Supply and Heavy Repair Base.
- ⊗ Naval Supply and Light Repair Base.
- ⊕ Naval Lion.
- ⊓ Naval Cub.
- ⚓ Minor Naval Facilities.
- ⊕ Air Depot.
- Proposed.

~~TOP SECRET~~



Darwin  
□ ⊕ ⊕

Gairns  
○ ⊕



